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Beautiful people earn more. Surprisingly, this premium is larger for men than for 
women and is independent of the degree of customer contact. Overlooked is the 
possibility that beauty can influence college admissions. We explore this academic 
contributor to the labor market beauty earnings premium by sampling 1,800 social 
media profiles of students from universities ranked from 1 to 200 in China and the 
US. Chinese universities use only standardized test scores for admissions. In 
contrast, US universities use also grades and extracurricular activities, which are 
not necessarily beauty-blind. Consistent with beauty-blind admissions, student’s 
beauty is uncorrelated with the rank of their college in China. In the US, White men 
from higher ranked colleges are better-looking. As expected, the correlation is 
insignificant for White men who attended tech colleges and is highest for those who 
attended private colleges. We also find that White women and minorities of either 
gender are not better-looking at higher ranked colleges. Our evidence indicates a 
college admissions contribution to the labor market beauty premium for US White 
men, but not for students in China of either gender, White women, or minorities of 
either gender in the US, or for White men who attended technology colleges. 
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I. Introduction 
Beautiful people earn more. Such is the conclusion of a burgeoning literature initiated by Biddle 
and Hamermesh (1994). Surprisingly, beauty seems to matter more for men than for women, and 
in most jobs, instead of being limited to those with extensive dealings with customers who might 
indulge a taste for beauty. (See A-Table 1 in the Appendix for a summary of the beauty premium 
for men and women across studies.) To explain these unexpected findings, several authors have 
proposed employer discrimination through the channel of human resource (HR) managers as a 
potential cause. However, overlooked is the possibility that the beauty premium originates prior to 
the labor market, specifically in the college admissions process, within which the discretion of 
teachers, guidance counselors, and admissions officers to discriminate, are comparable to that of 
HR managers. In fact, colleges seem to do precisely that when seeking talent in “leadership, 
performing arts, or athletics”, all of which either influence or are influenced by popularity, and 
hence, by beauty among high school students.1 In the case of the election of high school students 
to leadership positions, beauty may the crucial factor considering that the voting public (Berggren, 
Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010) and even Ph.D. economists (Hamermesh 2006) exhibit a bias for 
beauty in the election of their leaders. 
We test for this potential college admissions contribution to the labor market beauty premium 
by sampling 1,800 online social media profiles across a wide range of universities (ranked 1−200) 
in China and in the US. Given that US universities use extracurricular activities and grades in the 
decision to admit students (Green, Jaschik, and Lederman 2011), we hypothesize that the beauty 
of students may increase the rank of the university they attended in the US. In contrast, Chinese 
universities use standardized test scores almost exclusively to admit students (Bai and Chi 2014; 
Li et al. 2012; Yang 2014). 2 Despite the shortcomings of such an admissions system in terms of 
the stress it imposes on students (Cai et al. 2019), it is necessarily beauty-blind. In light of a recent 
 
1 According to a recent New York Times article (Cain 2017), ‘Harvard’s application informs students that its mission is “to educate our students 
to be citizens and citizen-leaders for society.” Yale’s website advises applicants that it seeks “the leaders of their generation”. On Princeton’s site, 
“leadership activities” are first among equals on a list of characteristics for would-be students to showcase. Even Wesleyan, known for its artistic 
culture, was found by one study to evaluate applicants based on leadership potential…Whatever the colleges’ intentions, the pressure to lead now 
defines and constricts our children’s adolescence….It seemed no activity or accomplishment meant squat unless it was somehow connected to 
leadership.’ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/opinion/sunday/not-leadership-material-good-the-world-needs-followers.html?_r=1 2 A number of top-tier universities in China admit some outstanding students, e.g., winners of international mathematics competitions through 
special channels that involve the university’s own admissions exams, followed by oral exam type interviews. However, details on the policies for 
specific universities are not publicly available.  
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large sample study of twins which finds no relationship between facial attractiveness and 
intelligence (Mitchem et al. 2015), we hypothesize that no association exists between the beauty 
of students and the rank of the university they attended in China.  
Our hypothesis for China is confirmed: the facial beauty of Chinese students of either gender is 
uncorrelated with the rank of the college they attended. Our hypothesis for the US is confirmed 
only for White men (74% of our male sample). Only their facial beauty increases with the rank of 
college attended.  
We test further the hypothesis that reliance on standardized tests diminishes the association 
between the beauty of students and the rank of the college that we find for White men by checking 
for variation in the magnitude of the correlation across different types of colleges. We separate our 
sample of White men according to whether they attended private, public, or technology colleges. 
Compared to public colleges, private colleges can rely less on standardized tests than public 
colleges, because they are less regulated. As expected, the association between facial beauty and 
the rank of the college attended is stronger for private colleges. On the other hand, technology 
colleges should attach more weight to technical ability as indicated by standardized test scores 
than non-technology colleges.3 Accordingly, we find that the association between beauty and the 
rank of the college attended is insignificant for technology colleges. Thus, reliance on standardized 
tests appears to suppress the correlation between the beauty of White men and the rank of their 
college, while discretion in admissions criteria increases it. 
Our finding that the beauty of both genders in China, White women and non-White minorities 
of both genders in the US, and White men in tech colleges, is not associated with the rank of their 
college supports prior evidence that beauty is uncorrelated with intelligence. Our contribution to 
this literature on the association between intelligence and beauty is to provide further evidence 
against an association between beauty and general academic ability, as captured through the 
variation in the rank of colleges. For our sample of US White women and non-White minorities of 
both genders, we also provide evidence that beauty is not associated with non-academic criteria, 
e.g., leadership qualities and athletic ability, that US colleges also use for admitting students.  
 
3 A former director of admissions at Dartmouth, an elite private college, revealed that it was very difficult to choose from among the many 
academically well-qualified candidates of the two thousand applications she read per year (Sabky 2017). In her view, personal essays by the 
candidate and letters of recommendation from illustriousness mentors are generally uninformative. Rather, she must resort to idiosyncratic signals 
such as “inappropriate email addresses”, behavior on a campus visit, or an unusual recommender—in the case of the article--the janitor of the 
student’s high school. Additionally, she sometimes give those signals greater priority than standardized test scores in her admissions decision. See: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/check-this-box-if-youre-a-good-person.html?mtrref=query.nytimes.com&assetType=opinion 
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We check for the simple association between the rank of the college attended and after 
graduation wages to get a sense of the potential economic importance of the college admissions 
contribution to the labor market beauty premium for White men. For our White men sample, a one 
percentage point increase in beauty rank corresponds to a two-college increase in the rank of the 
college attended. This correspondence translates in to a roughly six percent increase in salary 10 
years after graduation for a 10 percent increase in beauty rank.  
The association between beauty and earnings for White men that we find is of a similar 
magnitude to that previously found for the labor market beauty premium, which ranges from 5-20 
percent for the coarser measure of below, at, or above average looks (A-Table 1). In principle, it 
is possible for the variation in the beauty of White men to be of comparable magnitude because, 
while these previous studies of the labor market beauty premium do control for years of education, 
they do not control for the rank of college among those who graduated from college.  
In light of the previous finding that intelligence is not correlated with beauty, our finding of no 
significant correlation between the beauty of students and the rank of their college for students of 
both genders in China, White women and non-White minorities of both genders in the US, and 
White men in tech colleges suggest that the correlation we find for White men who graduated from 
non-tech colleges is not related to their academic ability. We discuss the potential channels through 
which the beauty of only White men may affect or be affected by their admissions to college after 
the main results. 
We contribute to the literature on the labor market beauty premium by providing evidence which 
suggests a college admission contribution to the labor market beauty earnings premium for men in 
the US, who are mostly White. 4  This college admissions contribution may help explain the 
surprisingly greater labor market beauty premium for men in the US, and why it does not vary 
across jobs with significant and insignificant exposure to customers. Our evidence suggests that 
the labor market beauty premium for men and women in China (Deng, Li, and Zhou 2019; Gu and 
Ji 2019; Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang 2002; Maurer-Fazio and Lei 2015) and for women and 
non-Whites of both genders in the US may arise after college. Our results suggest the potential 
importance of controlling not only for the years of education in future studies of the labor market 
beauty premium, but also for the rank of the college attended, particularly for men. 
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II. Review of labor market studies on the labor market beauty premium 
Several empirical studies have demonstrated a robust labor market beauty premium for workers 
around the world and in various sectors beginning with the seminal work of Biddle and 
Hamermesh (1994). The theories of labor market discrimination by beauty parallel those of other 
forms of labor market discrimination, e.g., by race. These fall under two broad categories: taste-
based discrimination (Becker 1971), where the discriminated characteristic, in this case, beauty, 
enters directly into the utility function, and productivity-based or statistical discrimination (Arrow 
1973), where the observable characteristic, also beauty, is correlated with the characteristic that 
that influences productivity. As an example of the taste-based discrimination, customers, e.g., 
purchasers of fashion magazines, can derive utility directly from better-looking workers. As an 
example of the latter statistical discrimination, employers may discriminate by hiring good-looking 
people because beauty signals pleasant manners and good social skills, which are not as 
immediately observable as beauty. Employers may value such skills because they either increase 
customer satisfaction or the productivity of other workers. Alternatively, consumers can use beauty 
to infer other characteristics, e.g., competence in doctors, because of a possible statistical 
relationship between beauty and cognitive and non-cognitive skills. 
Since the inception of the literature, a notable and surprisingly larger beauty premium/plainness 
penalty has existed for men than for women (Borland and Leigh 2014; Doorley and Sierminska 
2015; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Harper 2000; Mocan and Tekin 2010). Moreover, the 
importance of looks as revealed through employer surveys on the amount of interaction with 
customers show little explanatory power for the cross-sectional beauty premium (Doorley and 
Sierminska 2015; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). See A-Table 1 in the Appendix. While the 
constancy of the beauty premium across jobs can be explained by employer discrimination, that 
would not seem to predict a larger premium for men than for women. 
These unexpected findings highlight other potential problems in identifying the source of the 
labor market beauty premium. Other factors can increase a person’s ability to make themselves 
more beautiful, which, in turn, increases their wages. For example, intelligence, which is generally 
associated with productivity in most jobs, can potentially increase the skill with which flattering 
clothes (which has been shown to add to the income of women (Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang 
2002)) are chosen. Alternatively, intelligence can free up more time from other tasks with which 
to choose these clothes. Intelligence can also increase confidence, which may enhance the 
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impression a person makes, e.g., if confidence in one’s ability makes one smile more easily, and 
if smiling enhances attractiveness. Accordingly, more intelligent workers can appear more 
attractive, thereby earning higher wages, although they are not necessarily more physically 
attractive. Customers may not derive utility from the exceptional intelligence of those workers. 
Instead, these customers can derive utility from the friendliness of more confident workers, e.g., 
in a restaurant host/hostess.  
Aside from intelligence, a myriad of other factors related to productivity including health and 
family income can conceivably contribute to both the beauty of workers and their wages. Thus, 
important confounders for both taste-based and statistical discrimination for the labor market 
beauty premium exist. In addition to the identification problems, the gender difference in 
significance can also be due to out-selection by attractive/unattractive women from the labor 
market, which again, is difficult to control for in empirical studies of the labor market.  
To minimize the effects of statistical discrimination and out-selection, several researchers in the 
beauty premium literature used CV correspondence studies of employers. These correspondence 
studies are widely used to explore ethnic and gender discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2004). Such studies with employers can decrease the effects of these confounders through random 
assignment of beauty to the characteristics associated with beauty, e.g., intelligence, which is 
signaled by education in the CVs. Confirming prior empirical findings of a beauty premium, a CV 
correspondence study in Argentina finds that distorted photos of real people designed to make 
them ugly were much less likely to obtain a callback López et al. (2013). With the exception of 
the pronounced premium for better-looking women in office support, receptionist, and customer 
service jobs, the authors ascertained roughly the same positive premium for both genders across 
jobs, irrespective of the degree of customer contact.  
A significant premium across all four occupations was observed in China, including areas such 
as software engineering, which has minimal customer contact (Maurer-Fazio and Lei 2015). A 
correspondence study in Israel using resumes with randomized photos of applicants with varying 
beauty shows that only better-looking men were more likely to receive a callback to a job 
application, whereas women suffered a beauty penalty in terms of callback rates, and even in jobs 
which, as the authors point out, beauty plays no obvious role: accounts management, budgeting, 
industrial engineering, and computer programming (2015).  
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However, despite the many positive findings on labor market discrimination by beauty, the 
existing literature has largely ignored the possibility that the beauty premium may begin before 
entry into the labor market. 5  The source of the beauty premium is important both to better 
understand labor market discrimination and also to better target antidiscrimination regulations 
based on personal appearance. Such legislation has already been enacted in some states and 
proposed elsewhere (Hamermesh 2011; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).  
The advantage of our study with respect to identification problems in the empirical and CV 
correspondence study literature is that we only look at the relation between beauty (as rated by 
impartial observers) and labor market productivity traits, as revealed by college rankings. Our 
raters are neither employers nor customers, either of whom might have a taste for beauty within 
particular industries (e.g., for very thin women in the modeling industry) or be concerned with 
unobserved productivity-related traits correlated with beauty. Thus, neither taste-based nor 
statistical discrimination by customers or employers are relevant to this study. Additionally, given 
that the profiles rated here are from pre-labor market university students, they are also less likely 
to be biased by those individuals who have systematically selected out of the sample by beauty for 
opportunities in the marriage market.  
Few studies in economics are available regarding the relation between academic performance 
and beauty. Grade point average is predicted by physical attractiveness for grade school students 
of both genders in England (Hansen 2016) and for female but not for male students upon entering 
high school (French et al. 2009). However, the association between attractiveness and grade point 
average becomes negative for males and insignificant for females when personality and grooming 
are controlled for (French et al. 2009). High school facial attractiveness can account for the 
attractiveness premium up to the mid-30s (Scholz and Sicinski 2015). Within an elite women’s 
liberal arts college, a negative correlation was found between beauty and academic productivity-
related traits, as measured by SAT scores (Deryugina and Shurchkov 2015). No correlation was 
found between beauty and productivity-related traits among lawyers who graduated from one law 
school (Biddle and Hamermesh 1998) and among experimental subjects (Mobius and Rosenblat 
 
5 Many studies exist on the correlates of beauty in educational settings in the psychology literature. Physically attractive students receive higher 
grades in high school and college (French et al. 2009). Attractive individuals are consistently perceived or judged more favorably than the 
unattractive in a number of dimensions, including intelligence, academic potential, grades, confidence, extroversion, and various social skills 
(Jackson, Hunter, and Hodge 1995; Mobius and Rosenblat 2006; Ritts, Patterson, and Tubbs 1992). These studies suggest that beauty is believed 
to be correlated with these traits. However, they do not control for these traits in their identification of beliefs. Thus, they failed to demonstrate that 
beauty causes the beauty premium in the labor market.  
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2006). Most importantly, with respect to our hypothesis, these prior studies either of single 
colleges, or if not, they did not test for the effect of the attended university's rank. Consequently, 
they do not rule out that the labor market beauty premium in terms earnings was due to a potential 
bias in the college application process. 
III. Methodology 
We randomly selected 30 universities in China and the US ranked from 1 to 200. Each selected 
college has similar rankings in at least two commonly used ranking systems. The rankings for US 
colleges include the U.S. News & World Report Ranking,6 the Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU), 7 whereas the Chinese University Alumni Alliance Ranking (CUAA)8 and 
the Wu Shulian’s Chinese University Rankings9 are for Chinese colleges. College rankings are 
shown in the A-Table 2 in the Appendix. 
We randomly sampled 30 profiles (15 for each gender) for each school on Facebook. In the US, 
72 percent of college students have a profile on Facebook.10 We used the social media site Renren 
in China, which had a reported membership of 280 million in 2013.11 In both services, users can 
create profiles for free with photos, other images, list of personal interests, contact information, 
accounts of memorable life events, and other personal information, such as educational 
background and employment status. Registration on the two social media sites requires filling in: 
name, gender, and email address or phone number. Renren also requires a birth date and 
educational information (either high school or college). The educational information of a Renren 
account can also be “verified” by a school IP address or the school email. Such verification is 
indicated in the profile. We used only such verified accounts. A user is also required to upload a 
personal photo for the profile picture.  
After registration, users can add other users as “friends” with whom they can share their profile 
content. Users can also join common-interest user groups which are organized by workplace, 
school, or other categories. Users determine who can browse their pages or receive their updates 
 
6 http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/data 
7 http://www.shanghairanking.com/World-University-Rankings-2015/USA.html 
8 http://www.cuaa.net/cur/2015/index_700  
9 http://edu.qq.com/zt2013/2013wsl/ 
10 http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/ 
11 Renren is the Facebook analog for college students in China, as Facebook is blocked by the Chinese Government.  
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with their privacy settings. On both websites, users can make their profile “public,” (anyone with 
a membership can see their profile) or “open to friends” (only “friends” can see their profile) or 
“private” (only the user themselves can view their profile). Both websites allow users to search for 
public profiles with specific educational backgrounds.  
Search engines generally employ confidential proprietary algorithms to enhance the efficiency 
of searches. To avoid any unobserved influences from such algorithms on our results, we selected 
the profile photo based on random numbers from 1 to 200 generated prior to our searches. Hence, 
if we drew a number 67, we would select the 67th profile in the search engine results. We drew two 
sets of random numbers: the second to be used in cases where the profile indicated by the first 
number did not have the required information or photo quality.12 Each selected profile was that of 
a student who graduated from the school as an undergraduate in 2012. The profile photo must be 
a clear color front-view photo without any head covering. Other people or backgrounds in the 
photos were cropped to highlight the face of the subject. We paid raters (5 RMB/100 pairs in China 
and 0.75 USD/100 pairs in the US) to evaluate all profile photos using a proprietary beauty rating 
program, which they could access through a standard web browser.13  
The rating program matched each photo randomly with 10 other photos of the same gender in 
the same country. 4,500 photo pairs are generated for each gender in each country. We used 
multiple raters to rate the same photo. In the US, each photo was rated 12−37 times by US raters, 
with a mean of 22 times. In China, each photo was rated 12−28 times, with a mean of 20 times. 
Such rating frequencies are comparable to other studies (Deryugina and Shurchkov 2015). The 
final rating for each photo is based on the average rating of all raters of that photo. In total, 90 
Chinese raters (60 male) rated all 900 Chinese photos, and 103 US raters (49 males, 86 White) 
rated all 900 US photos. The Chinese raters were graduate students recruited from the Peking 
University HSBC School of Business through a mass email. The US raters were recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, a project-based employment service offered by Amazon.  
We also hired an additional 27 US raters to categorize the race (White, Black, Hispanic, and 
Asian) and age ranges (age categories: 23−26 and 27 or older) of all US photos. Chinese students 
are almost always of the Han majority and within the 23−26 age range because they rarely take 
 
12 These criteria are available on request. 
13 At the time of writing, the exchange rate was 1 USD for 6.5 RMB. Given the few minutes it takes to rate all 100 photos, our payment was 
relatively high for both Mechanical Turk and China. A high wage was set to attract sufficient numbers of raters in a short time span.  
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time off before college.14 Unlike US Facebook profiles, age is listed with the Chinese profiles on 
Renren. Each US rater was asked to categorize 100 US photos. Each US photo was categorized 
once each by three different US raters. The final race and age categories of the US photos were 
determined by the ratings of the US majority raters, i.e., two or three out of three. The results of 
the race and age categorization for the US sample are shown in A-Table 4. 
Raters were asked to choose the more physically attractive within each pair. Instead of asking 
raters for a numerical rating within a certain range of numbers, as is standard in the field 
(Hamermesh and Biddle 1994), we followed the methodology in Ong, Yang, and Zhang (2020) 
asked raters to decide only which photo of a pair is better-looking. Such a judgment may be easier 
and more precise than assigning a number to indicate how good-looking someone is according to 
a subjective numerical scale (Negahban, Oh, and Shah 2012).  
Numerical beauty ratings can cluster around specific numbers, e.g., 7 or 8 out of 10. A given 
subject may not be consistent in their beauty ratings across a number of photos, because of fatigue, 
lapses in memory, or because their subjective reference benchmark level of beauty changes as they 
rate photos. In contrast, binary decisions require discerning only the minimal difference in beauty 
between two photos in side-by-side comparison. Subjects do not need to strain their memory to 
maintain the consistency of the ratings for photos with similar beauty, if these photos happen to 
have many other intervening photos. With a binary comparison, the accuracy of a subject’s 
memory is no longer an issue. The binary decision also avoids potential scale differences across 
individuals, genders, and countries (e.g., where Chinese females choose higher numbers than 
American male raters), which can add noise to the data.  
To deal with these sources of noise, prior studies coarsen their 1-7 scale data into three categories: 
below, at, or above average beauty. However, this may sacrifice the precision we exploit to 
establish our hypotheses below. Lastly, our reliance on the binary choices of raters means that our 
beauty ranking is a relative ranking within the sample, not a potentially out of sample/absolute 
ranking against unobserved subjective protypes of beauty that the subject has in mind and uses as 
a benchmark.  
The software we developed aggregates the ratings for each photo into a continuous number 
between 0 percent (least attractive) and 100 percent (most attractive) using the well-established 
 
14 The Han race constitutes 91 percent of the population of China, See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_minorities_in_China. The share of 
Hans is likely even higher among university students. 
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Bradley–Terry model for aggregating binary comparisons into a ranking (Bradley and Terry 1952).  
For each photo, these numbers represent the attractiveness percentile, namely, the share of other 
photos that reviewers on average found less attractive.  
The following equation is estimated for each country: 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜) + 𝜀    Eq. (1) 
 
where 𝑖 is the index of individual students. 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ refers to the log of college rank within 
each country. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ is a number between 0 percent and 100 percent representing the aggregate 
rating given by the raters. We invert the ranking, i.e., use 1 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ so that a smaller beauty 
percent number (high beauty rank) corresponds to smaller college rank number (high rank college). 
We abuse notation slightly and omit the inversion from the text. The 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ variable is derived 
from the residual of a regression in which we control for subject’s age (using a dummy variable 
which takes on the value of 0 for the age range 23−26 and the value of 1 for 27 and older) based 
on the listed age of the profile in China, and the age attributed by the raters for profiles in the US. 
In this regression, we also controlled for display rank of the photo in the search engine results, 
which could be affected by the unobserved search algorithm.  
IV. Results 
The coefficient for beauty percentile (0.032) in column (1) of Table 1 is small and statistically 
insignificant indicating 
Observation I. The beauty of students in China has no economically or statistically significant 
association to the rank of the college they attended.  
We separate the data by gender because the correlation between beauty and ability can vary by 
gender. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 show that  
Observation II. The beauty of men (0.0832) or women (-0.00931) in China has no economically 
or statistically significant association to the rank of the college they attended. 
In contrast, column (1) of Table 2 indicates that the coefficient is not small for students as a 
whole (0.131) in the US, though it is still statistically insignificant due to the large standard error.  
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Observation III. The beauty of students in the US has no statistically significant association to 
the rank of the college they attended. 
Similarly, columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 indicate that 
Observation IV. The beauty of men (0.370) or women (-0.114) in the US has no statistically 
significant association to the rank of the college they attended in the US. 
Thus, while the insignificant and near zero coefficients for students in China indicate a true zero 
effect of beauty on the rank of college attended, the larger but insignificant coefficients and along 
with large standard errors for students in the US implies that our estimates are imprecise. Such 
imprecision could be due to heterogeneous effects of the US student’s beauty on the rank of the 
college they attended. In particular, the association between students’ beauty and the rank of the 
college they attended can also vary by race, especially if colleges may seek different qualities from 
different races. White men and women make up the largest part (660/900 = 73%) of the sample. 
Figure 1 displays the plot of the beauty rank of students at a given college vs. the numerical value 
of college rank for US White men and women. The right panel shows that the men’s beauty rank 
monotonically increases on the rank of the college attended, whereas the left panel shows that of 
women does not.  
Column (4) of Table 2 reveals that college rank becomes significant for Whites (0.441) and 
columns (5) and (6) reveals that this trend is driven by White men.  
Observation V. The beauty of White men (0.740), but not White women (0.126) significantly 
increases with the rank of the college attended in the US. 
The 0.740 coefficient for log college rank suggests that for every percentage point increase in 
beauty rank, there is a 2.1=𝑒଴.଻ସ increase in the rank of the college attended. The significance of 
the coefficient of college rank for White men and the insignificance for White women hold also 
when we use college rank without the log transformation.  
We hypothesize that the correlates of beauty might affect admissions in the US through the 
exercise of discretion as to the merits signaled by extracurricular activities. According to this 
hypothesis, we should find a greater association between beauty and the rank of the college 
attended for private colleges, which have greater discretion because they are less regulated. To test 
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this hypothesis, we redo the previous regressions by comparing results without and with only 
private colleges (namely, Harvard, Columbia, Penn, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New 
York University, Boston University, Stevens Institute of Technology, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, and New Jersey Institute of Technology) in Table 3. The coefficient for beauty rank 
increases from 0.339 in column (1) for public colleges to 1.726 in column (2) for private colleges, 
suggesting that an incremental increase in the beauty rank is associated with a greater increase in 
the rank of college attended among private colleges. This greater association is confirmed in 
column (5) with the positive coefficient for the interaction of the private dummy variable and 
beauty rank (1.388) for the full sample of both private and public colleges.  
These results suggest that the correlates of beauty have a larger effect on the rank of colleges for 
students who attended private colleges. For White men who attended private colleges, a one 
percent increase in beauty rank corresponds to a 5.6=𝑒ଵ.଻ଶ଺ increase in the rank of the college 
attended or an almost two percent increase in salary for a one percent increase in beauty rank. The 
negative coefficient for private college without interaction with beauty (-3.105) indicates that on 
average, White males who attended private colleges are less attractive.  
This finding of a higher slope for the regression of college rank on beauty along with a lower 
intercept for private as compared to publics colleges raises the possibility that private colleges can 
themselves be more heterogeneous than public colleges in terms of how much the correlates of 
beauty affect the chance of admissions of White men. A potential reason for the greater level of 
heterogeneity among private as compared to public colleges is, higher ranked private colleges 
might have a greater latitude and need to resort to soft criteria in order to reject more otherwise 
similar high-quality students, while lower ranked private colleges may use their greater discretion 
to admit more marginal candidates.  
To test the hypothesis that higher ranked private colleges are more selective than lower ranked 
private colleges in terms of beauty or its correlates, we drop the top four private colleges from our 
sample: Harvard, Columbia, Penn, MIT, that are ‘top-10’ in column (3), while leaving in the 
bottom five private colleges in the sample. The coefficient decreases to 0.289. If we drop the 
bottom four ranked private colleges: Boston University, Stevens, IIT, and NJIT in Column (4), the 
coefficient increases to 0.814. These results suggest that beauty or its correlates may have a much 
larger effect for admissions to the top private colleges than to the lower ranked private colleges.  
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Columns (6-8) show results for technology colleges, which may rely less on discretion and more 
on standardized tests. This conjecture is confirmed by 1) the contrast between the significant 
coefficient for beauty rank (0.836) in column (6) which drops technology colleges and the 
insignificant coefficient for beauty rank (0.256) in column (7) which contains data only from 
technology colleges and 2) by the insignificance of the technology beauty rank interaction in 
column (8). 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients for non-White races of either gender are negative, but too 
imprecisely measured to be statistically significant. This lack of significance does not seem to be 
due to the sample sizes being smaller than that of Whites, however. For non-White men and 
women, we have 119 and 121 observations, respectively. Both are nearly twice as large as the 
number of observations that we have for White men in private colleges for column (2) of Table 3, 
which was still significant at the 5 percent level. However, many of the sample sizes for the 
coefficients for the correlation of disaggregated minorities in columns (3)-(8) are too small to draw 
any inference. Hence, we make an observation for the non-Whites, and merely remark that the 
disaggregated data is consistent with the aggregate. 
Observation VI. The beauty of non-Whites (Black, Hispanic, or Asian students) in the US have 
no statistically significant association with the rank of the college they attended. 
These findings of no significant correlation between the beauty of students and the rank of their 
college for students of both genders in China, White women and non-White minorities of both 
genders in the US, and White men in tech colleges, suggests that the correlation we find for White 
men is due to non-academic factors used in the admissions process. We discuss some potential 
non-academic factors in the admissions process which might interact with the beauty of White 
men, in particular, in the Discussion and Conclusion section.  
We perform a simple regression of the median and the expected salary (not broken down by race 
or gender) on college rank to obtain a rough estimate of the economic impact of beauty on earnings. 
An incremental increase in college rank for a student enrolled in 2001 increases their expected 
salary by 139 USD and actual median salary 172 USD per year in 2011. (See A-Table 2 for the 
data.) Thus, a one percentage point increase in beauty rank corresponds to an increase in expected 
salary of 0.6 percent (2*139/42,740 USD) in mean salary and a 0.4 percent (2*172/41,500 USD) 
per year in median salary. 
Page 14 
This association, and therefore, potential effect of beauty, is sizeable when compared to prior 
studies which use coarsened ratings: below, at, or above average looks. When we categorize our 
ratings into bottom-, middle-, and top-, our findings suggest that a 33 percent increase in beauty 
rating would result in a 24 percent increase in salary. Given that the data we use are based on 
salaries 10 years after graduation, differences in salary across colleges of different rank can also 
be due to increasing returns from graduating from higher ranked colleges. However, the change in 
expected salary per increase in the rank of the college attended is approximately 0.3% 
(137/42,740), which is similar to new graduates in China (0.25%).15 The effect of college rank on 
salary may also be large because our beauty data are across-colleges and can tend toward picking 
up across-industry effects, whereas prior studies are generally within-college or within-industry.  
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
We find, aggregating across genders, the beauty of students does not have an economically or 
statistically significant effect on the rank of the college they attended in China either as a whole 
(Observation I) or when separated by genders (Observation II). The statistical insignificance held 
also for US students as a whole (Observation III) and when we separated by gender (Observation 
IV). However, facial beauty is significantly associated with the rank of the college attended for 
White men, but not for White women (Observation V). The association for White men is strongest 
for higher ranked, and presumably, less regulated private colleges (Table 3). In contrast, the beauty 
of students in technology colleges has no significant association with the rank of the college.  
A one percentage point increase in the beauty rank of White men is associated with a two-college 
increase in the rank of college attended. Such an advantage corresponds to roughly a 0.6 percent 
increase in salary 10 years after graduation using the salary of the lowest ranked college as the 
benchmark. When we categorize into three categories (top-, middle-, bottom-thirds), this 
association seems sufficient to explain the previously found labor market beauty premium which 
ranges from 5-20 percent for the coarser measure of beauty: below, at, or above average looks (A-
Table 1).  
Importantly for interpreting these results, our finding in China suggests that beauty is not 
statistically significantly associated with college rank. This outcome suggests that academic 
 
15 Data available on request. 
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ability, at least as measured by standardized tests, is not associated with beauty. Our finding that 
the beauty of White women’s and non-Whites of either gender is not correlated with the rank of 
the college they attended in the US suggests, moreover, that academic ability in general, not only 
as measured by standardized tests, but also including that measured by grades, letters of 
recommendation, is also not necessarily associated with beauty. This lack of correlation for White 
women and non-Whites of either gender suggests that the beauty premium we find for White men 
is the result of non-academic factors which might specifically benefit White men in the admissions 
process.  
An important question for the validity of our positive results for White men in the US is whether 
there was self-selection into social media by beauty. It is beyond the scope of this study to address 
this question directly. However, we have a number of benchmarks groups to help mitigate this 
concern. If men tend to self-select into social media by beauty and the rank of their college, we 
would also expect that they would in China, and that White women, non-White minorities, and 
White men at technology colleges also would in the US. But, these groups apparently do not. We 
know of no basis to suggest that only White men who attended non-technology colleges in the US 
would self-select according to their beauty on to social media. Hence, the possibility that our 
results for White men are driven by self-selection seems implausible, or at least, less plausible than 
other alternatives, which we discuss below. 
Another potential issue with our data is reverse causality. We use photos of graduates from 2012. 
The corresponding photos could have been taken in 2012 or even later, and likely much later than 
the year in which the admission decision was made. Consequently, the rank of the college attended 
can potentially affect the beauty rank if the college rank increases salary, and salary increases 
beauty by rendering better grooming and clothing more affordable. Again, if the direction of 
causality were reversed, we should find a similar association between the college rank and beauty 
in China, where graduates of higher ranked colleges earn comparably higher salaries, or for White 
women, non-White minorities, and White men in technology colleges in the US. However, we find 
no such association for members of these other groups.  
As to why better-looking White men in particular may be favored in the admissions process, a 
correspondence study in Israel offers a potential clue (Ruffle and Shtudiner 2015). They find a 
beauty premium only for men, and surprisingly, a beauty penalty for women. Notably, this beauty 
penalty was driven by firms using in-house HR personnel, who they also find, are almost always 
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younger women. The authors infer that the bias against hiring more beautiful women is driven by 
female sexual jealousy.  
Such a bias could also exist in the admissions process for elite colleges. The potential favoritism 
of teachers or admissions officers and alumni who interview candidates for better-looking male 
students can help explain our findings for men, especially if the interviewers tend to be female and 
White themselves, given a same-race bias among women (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely 2010).16 
This possibility of teacher or admissions interviewer bias for better-looking men is especially 
important for elite colleges, like Harvard, which rely heavily upon interviews in the admissions 
process, particularly for athletes (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom 2019). However, there is no 
need to posit a pervasive self-serving taste-based discrimination on the part of the people involved 
in the admissions process to explain our results.  
It is widely known and often openly acknowledged that colleges favor admitting athletes. For 
example, in one survey, 28 percent of four year college admissions directors in the US 
acknowledged using lower standards to admit athletes (Green, Jaschik, and Lederman 2011).  
Colleges do so because they benefit from favoritism to male athletes. High-ability athletes bring 
positive attention to their college by helping to win intercollege sports competitions. Such attention 
increases alumni donations (Anderson 2017; Meer and Rosen 2009), the number (McCormick and 
Tinsley 1987) and quality of applicants (Pope and Pope 2014; Tucker and Amato 2006), and allows 
the university to charge a higher tuition (Alexander and Kern 2009). Moreover, if HR managers at 
elite firms discriminate by athletic ability (Rivera 2011), colleges can improve their placement 
record by discriminating similarly in their admissions decisions.  
In the case of Harvard, recruited athletes are admitted with drastically lower academic standards. 
Such lower standards result in an admissions rate of 86% for recruited athletes, which is over 14 
times higher than for students who are not recruited athletes. As a consequence, recruited athletes 
make up over 10% of the admitted class though they are 1% of the applicant pool. Importantly for 
explaining our findings, 70% of admitted recruited athletes at Harvard are White (Arcidiacono, 
Kinsler, and Ransom 2019).  
Hence, the favoritism colleges show towards athletes can help explain why we find that White 
men are better-looking in higher ranked colleges in the US, especially at elite private colleges. 
 
16 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TCHR.FE.ZS 
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Selecting for top-male athletes may also select for male beauty. The key factor which connects 
athletic ability and male beauty is prenatal exposure to androgens. The second-to-fourth digit 
length ratio (2D:4D) has been proposed as measure of prenatal exposure to androgens. A low 
2D:4D ratio is associated with a large body size (Klimek et al. 2014), greater lean body mass 
(Schroeder et al. 2012), a more dominant personality (Neave et al. 2003), a greater propensity for 
risk taking (Apicella, Carré, and Dreber 2015), success as finance traders (Coates, Gurnell, and 
Rustichini 2009), and a higher level of facial masculinity (Pound, Penton-Voak, and Surridge 
2009). Larger size, leaner body mass, greater risk taking, and more domineering personality likely 
confer advantages in competitive sports. Hence, it has been found that a low 2D:4D ratio is a 
predictor of athletic prowess and success in highly competitive sports (Coates, Gurnell, and 
Rustichini 2009; Hönekopp and Schuster 2010), including within the college varsity sports setting 
(Giffin et al. 2012). Therefore, a preference for admitting male athletes, especially for the most 
popular varsity sports, e.g., football and basketball, likely selects for these physical and 
psychological traits—as well as height. The selection for higher levels of these stereotypically 
male features likely increases with the rank of college, because higher ranked colleges can draw 
from a larger pool of applicants. 
Though the digit ratio of competitive female athletes are also lower than non-athletes (Giffin et 
al. 2012; Hönekopp and Schuster 2010), there is little evidence to suggest that prenatal testosterone 
also contributes to the female facial attractiveness which we measure. We are unaware of any other 
organic connection between traditional female facial attractiveness and athletic ability. Hence, 
given the connection between male athletic ability and male beauty made by male androgens and 
the preponderance of White men among male athletes, the preference colleges show towards 
athletes can help explain our finding that only White males are better-looking at higher ranked 
colleges in the US, but not White females or minorities. 
In addition to selection for better-looking men through the preference for athletes, universities 
may also implicitly select for better-looking men when they select for applicants with 
demonstrated leadership experience. Leadership contests among high school students may well be 
little more than popularity contests, and beauty increases popularity (Gu and Ji 2019). Moreover, 
athletic ability, height, a large lean body, facial masculinity, and a daring and domineering 
personality, may complement the stereotypically masculine traits of leaders in the West, and 
thereby, contribute to the charisma and confidence expected of leaders, especially among 
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adolescents (Mobius and Rosenblat 2006). White students from rich families may be over- 
represented among applying students showing high leadership potential. White students from rich 
families are the majority at elite private high schools. Private high schools are smaller than public 
high schools and tend to have more leadership opportunities (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom 
2019). Thus, a potential reason why we find a significant correlation between the beauty of only 
White men and the rank of the college they attended is that White women and other racial 
minorities may be less able to exploit the favoritism colleges show towards students with 
leadership experience in the admissions process.  
In summary, we do not find a significant correlation between the beauty of students and the rank 
of the college they graduated from for Chinese students of either gender, White women and non-
White minorities of either gender, or for White men who graduated from technical colleges. In 
light of the previous finding that intelligence is not correlated with beauty, our finding would 
further suggest that beauty is not correlated with academic ability, as measured by college ranking, 
we do find a significant positive correlation between the beauty of White men and the rank of the 
college they attended, if they attended non-technical public or private colleges, with the strongest 
correlation for those who attended private colleges. We suggest that a potential channel of the 
college admissions contribution to the labor market beauty premium for White men may due the 
favoritism colleges show in the admissions process towards athletes or leaders of high school 
clubs. Our evidence suggests that the labor market beauty premium for men and women in China 
and for White women and non-White minorities of either gender in the West originates in the labor 
market, while that of White men may have a college admissions contribution.  
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Tables 
TABLE 1: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CHINA 
Dependent variable College rank 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 China Men Women 
    
Beauty percentile 0.032 0.0832 -0.00931 
 (0.204) (0.310) (0.270) 
Observations 900 450 450 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Notes: The dependent variable is college rank is in log form. Chinese profiles are rated by Chinese raters. The control variables include 
the display rank (the position of the profile in the search result) and the age. 
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TABLE 2: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE US 
Dependent variable College rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Men Women White White men White women 
       
Beauty percentile  0.131 0.370 -0.114 0.441** 0.740** 0.126 
 (0.184) (0.272) (0.246) (0.193) (0.291) (0.249) 
Observations 900 450 450 660 331 329 
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.019 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Notes: The dependent variable is college rank is in log form. US profiles are rated by US raters. The dependent variable is the beauty 
rating by the US raters of the US profiles. The control variables include the display rank (the position of the profile in the search result) 
and the age. 
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TABLE 3: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE US WHITE MEN 
Dependent variable College rank  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Only public Only private Drop top private Drop bot private Full sample Drop tech Only tech Full sample 
         
Beauty percentile 0.339** 1.726** 0.289** 0.814*** 0.339** 0.836** 0.256 0.836** 
 (0.137) (0.748) (0.142) (0.311) (0.138) (0.326) (0.615) (0.327) 
Private     -3.105***    
     (0.404)    
Private*beauty rank     1.388*    
     (0.755)    
Tech        -0.580 
        (0.691) 
Tech*beauty rank        0.199 
        (0.369) 
Observations 256 75 293 304 331 265 66 331 
R-squared 0.021 0.061 0.013 0.0219 0.500 0.026 0.002 0.022 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Notes: The dependent variable is college rank is in log form. US profiles are rated by the US raters. Column (1) uses data only from 
public colleges. Column (2) uses data only from private colleges. Column (3) drops the top-4 private colleges. Column (4) drops the 
bottom-4 private colleges. Column (5) uses the full data set for White men and includes the private college dummy along with its 
interaction with beauty rank. Column (6) uses data only from non-technology colleges. Column (7) uses data only from technology 
colleges. Column (8) uses the full data set for White men and includes the technology college dummy along with its interaction with 
beauty rank. The control variables include the display rank (the position of the profile in the search result) and the age. 
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TABLE 4: WITHIN GENDER REGRESSION RESULTS FOR US NON-WHITES 
Dependent 
variable College rank 
 Non-White Black Hispanic Asian 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
         
Beauty percentile -0.177 -0.263 -0.441 -1.901 0.158 0.666 1.770 -0.321 
 (0.668) (0.625) (0.839) (1.629) (1.172) (0.963) (1.155) (1.027) 
Observations 119 121 24 27 46 35 39 49 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.039 0.000 0.009 0.050 0.003 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Notes: The dependent variable is college rank is in log form. The beauty rank of the US profiles rated by the US raters. The dependent 
variable is the beauty rating by all US raters. The control variables include the display rank (the position of the profile in the search 
result) and the age. 
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Appendix 
A-TABLE 1: EFFECT OF BEAUTY ON WAGES ACROSS COUNTRIES*  
Country Paper Gender Occupation 
Wage effect 
Notes Above-average 
looks (%) 
Below-average 
looks (%) 
Canada & US Hamermesh & Biddle (1994) 
Men General 5.4 -8.9 Stacked estimates Women 3.9 -5.5 
US Mocan & Tekin (2010) 
Men General 10.8 -7  Women 4.5 -7 
United 
Kingdom Harper (2000) 
Men General Not significant -14.9  Women Not significant -10.9 
Netherland Pfann et al. (2000) Both 
Advertising 
Firm 
18000 DFL increase in wage with 
average beauty changes from 10th 
to 90th percentile (assuming a 7.5% 
effect on wages averaging 150000 
DFL per year) 
Wage effect 
inferred from 
extraneous 
estimates 
China 
(Shanghai) 
Hamermesh et 
al. (2002) 
Men General - -  Women 17.9 - 
Brazil Sachsida et al. (2011) 
Men Salesmen Not significant Not significant  Women 9 Not significant 
Germany 
Doorley & 
Sierminska 
(2012) 
Men 
General 
14 - 
 
Women 20 - 
Luxembourg 
Doorley & 
Sierminska 
(2012) 
Men 
General 
-3 - 
 
Women 10 - 
Australia in 
1984 
Borland & 
Leigh (2014) 
Men General 11.6 Not significant  Women Not significant Not significant 
Australia in 
2009 
Borland & 
Leigh (2014) 
Men General Not significant -12.9  Women Not significant Not significant   
 
* Reproduced from Liu and Sierminska (2015). 
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A-TABLE 2: US UNIVERSITIES 
Name State US News rank Mean starting salary Median starting salary 
Harvard University MA 2 $74,469  $87,200  
Columbia University NY 4 $75,676  $72,900  
University of Pennsylvania PA 8 $68,816  $78,200  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology MA 7 $83,418  $91,600  
New York University NY 32 $60,530  $58,800  
Georgia Institute of Technology GA 35 $43,259  $41,500  
University of California-Davis CA 38 $50,971  $57,100  
Boston University  MA 42 $66,818  $67,000  
University of Florida  FL 48 $53,141  $51,300  
University of Texas–Austin TX 53 $54,495  $52,800  
University of Georgia GA 62 $52,772  $46,500  
University of Iowa IA 71 $45,999  $48,700  
University of Massachusetts-Amherst MA 76 $51,204  $49,600  
Stevens Institute of Technology NJ 76 $75,347  $82,800  
University of Vermont VT 85 $37,139  $44,000  
Florida State University  FL 95 $46,005  $44,000  
University of Missouri MO 99 $46,141  $46,000  
University at Buffalo-SUNY  NY 103 $50,187  $49,700  
University of Tennessee TN 106 $42,580  $42,300  
Illinois Institute of Technology IL 116 $69,999  $68,200  
University of Arizona AZ 121 $43,698  $44,400  
University of Arkansas-Fayetteville AR 135 $46,247  $43,600  
Oklahoma State University  OK 145 $45,431  $43,400  
Texas Tech University TX 156 $47,291  $46,100  
San Diego State University CA 149 $46,622  $48,700  
New Jersey Institute of Technology NJ 149 $64,065  $65,300  
Mississippi State University MS 156 $42,506  $39,600  
University of Idaho ID 166 $38,390  $39,900  
University of Central Florida FL 173 $46,925  $43,000  
Southern Illinois University -Carbondale IL 189 $42,740  $41,500  
Notes: The median salary data is the salary of alumni in 2011 who enrolled in 2001. The data is from the US Department of Education 
College Scorecard, which we collected from The Economist magazine’s website:   
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/10/value-university 
The mean salary is the expected salary in 2011 calculated by The Economist, using a number of controls, again based on data from the 
US Department of Education College Scorecard. The difference between the median and the mean salaries is a measure of value added 
by the college. 
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A-TABLE 3: CHINESE UNIVERSITIES 
Name Province CUAA rank 
Peking University Beijing 1 
Fudan University Shanghai 3 
Nanjing University Jiangsu 8 
Sun Yat-Sen University Guangdong 14 
South China University of Technology Guangdong 18 
Central South University Hunan 19 
Xiamen University Fujian 22 
Hunan University Hunan 34 
Lanzhou University Gansu 36 
Beijing Jiaotong University Beijing 44 
Southwest University Chongqing 56 
Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications Beijing 61 
Hohai University Jiangsu 72 
Donghua University Shanghai 78 
Fuzhou University Fujian 84 
Guangxi University Guangxi 89 
Shanxi University Shanxi 95 
Shenzhen University Guangdong 105 
Hainan University Hainan 104 
Taiyuan University of Technology Shanxi 105 
Jiangsu University Jiangsu 133 
Shanghai Normal University Shanghai 136 
North University of China Shanxi 151 
Qinghai University Qinghai 139 
Huaqiao University Fujian 160 
Guangzhou University Guangdong 165 
Harbin University of Science and Technology Heilongjiang 167 
Changsha University of Science and Technology Hunan 170 
Ji'nan University Shandong 183 
Lanzhou University of Technology Gansu 190 
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A-TABLE 4: RACE AND AGE CATEGORIZATIONS FOR THE US SAMPLE 
 Number of observation 
 Women Men Total 
Race:    
White 329 331 660 
Black 27 24 51 
Hispanic 35 46 81 
Asian 49 39 88 
Unknown 10 10 20 
Total 450 450 900 
Age range:    
23−26 308 248 556 
27 or older 142 202 344 
Total 450 450 900 
 
